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Inheriting Horror: Historical Memory 
in French Socialists' and German Social 
Democrats' Fight for European Democracy, 
1945-1958 
Brian Shaev 
When one is an insoluble part of a people, as the SPD is of the German people, 
that involves consequences. No one can free himself from the bond of belonging 
to a class or nation. It is like an inheritance - one takes over the debts as well 
as the assets. (-Kurt Schumacher to the International Socialist Conference 
in Zurich, 8 June 194 71) 
Two years after the end of the Second World War, Kurt Schumacher 
addressed a transnational conference of European socialists on behalf of 
his party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Formally request-
ing the SPD's (re)admittance into the international socialist community, 
Schumacher spoke of the "debts" and "assets" that were his party's 
"inheritance." Schumacher was aware that before he and his international 
colleagues could begin to contemplate the future, there would be a frank 
and painful reckoning with the horrors of the recent past. Anticipating the 
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at-times hostile questions that were to come, Schumacher opened the 
meeting by binding past, present and future together in a metaphor of 
mutual obligation. 
The concept of inheritance is a fruitful entry point for an analysis of 
how historical memory shaped the political culture not only of post-war 
German social democracy but of French socialism as well. To bequeath is 
to pass a heritage through time and between people, that is, between gen-
erations. "No one can free himself from [this] bond," Schumacher said . 
The sense of compulsion that the past imposed on the present in the 
period after the Second World War is at the heart of this chapter. The argu-
ment, however, proceeds a step further. Although the emphasis of 
Schumacher's remark is on the "insoluble" relationship between the SPD 
and the German people, he places the "bond of belonging to a class" 
alongside that of nation. As we shall see later in this text, this allegiance to 
multiple (if overlapping) communities was not a remark isolated to trans-
national discussions; it was a strong feature of post-war SPD leaders' 
domestic discourses as well. These dual allegiances also emerge in state-
ments, both public and private, of post-war French socialist leaders. 
The temporal and spatial characteristics of German social democratic 
and French socialist discourses on democracy in the decade after the 
Second World War bear so much in common that it is appropriate to anal-
yse the party leaderships as a single generation of socialist politicians in 
post-war Europe. Most scholars of generation and memory continue to 
conceptualize their objects of study within national boundaries ( except for 
recent comparative and transnational studies of the generation of 1968) .2 
This leads to a general neglect of the possibility that, under specific sets of 
circumstances, transnational "memory communities" and generations 
may emerge. Jan Assmann writes that, in national memory communities, 
people "live in a shared world of symbolic meaning," accept the nation's 
"foundational memory" based on canonical texts and incorporate their 
personal experiences or "biographical memory" within the overarching 
memory culture. 3 In cases when memory is integral to a group's identity, 
Pierre Nora designates these "memory communities" with "debts and 
inheritances from the past," concepts that emerge in the quotation from 
Schumacher that opens this chapter.4 Generation, meanwhile, "remains a 
highly ambiguous concept" in academic literature.5 For Jurgen Reulecke, 
"generation and generationality are, in the end, not tangible entities but 
rather mental, often very zeitgeist-dependent constructs through which 
people, as members of a specific age group, are located or locate themselves 
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historically."6 The centrality of age and demography remains contentious 
in the literature on generation. Jean-Fran<;ois Sirinelli writes, "In political 
history, generation ... appears [ to have]. .. a chronologically elastic struc-
ture.m These authors are emblematic of their field in that they analyse 
generations as nationally bound entities, German in the case of Reulecke 
and French for Sirinelli. 
Generation and memory studies have called attention to divisions 
within national spheres. Below the "macro-formation of one culture," 
according to Jan Assmann, one finds "an array of cultural micro-
formations . " 8 Historians of memory, such as Henri Rousso, have analysed 
political parties as having distinct memory cultures.9 Scholars also agree 
that there was no homogenous memory discourse within Western 
European countries during the post-war period .10 In France, the resistance 
mythology was claimed by socialists, communists and Gaullists, but they 
presented different narratives of recent French history and contrary visions 
for the future. 11 Although historians of West Germany have emphasized a 
"community of silence" in the 1950s, the SPD frequently objected to the 
prevailing memory discourse of the time.12 Another set of historians have 
pointed to the importance of generational differences within political par-
ties, for instance, the "'45ers" and "68ers" in the SPD and the post-war 
generation around French Socialist leader Guy Mollet, the Algerian War 
generation that arose in the late 1950s to oppose him and the broader 
generation ofl968 that then followed. 13 
Although a number of recent works have encouraged scholars to con-
ceptualize historical memory in a European context, memory and genera-
tion studies have not really considered the impact of sustained transnational 
contact between sub-national groups, transnational exchanges and the 
possibility of the formation of transnational memory communities.14 The 
international socialist community-its rituals, symbols and institutions-is 
an ideal subject to explore the European dimension of generation and 
memory. The present chapter is a step in this direction. Scholars of genera-
tion emphasise the importance of a "founding moment," especially for 
those who "experienced times of radical upheaval and new beginnings," 
that serves to foster a "common vision of historical events." 15 Social psy-
chologists, for their part, have shown how experiences of collective trauma 
often serve as the strongest basis for bonds among group members.16 This 
chapter explores how the chain of events from the collapse of Weimar 
democracy to the Second World War facilitated a convergence of socialist-
memory cultures in post-war France and Germany. 
174 B. SHAEV 
French socialists and German social democrats often presented their 
experiences of exile, imprisonment, and torture during the Nazi and Vichy 
regimes as having resulted from their socialist identity in a European anti-
fascist struggle. Party leaders shared much in common in their analyses of 
the rise of Nazism, their assessment of non-socialist political forces, and 
the trajectory of post-war West German and French democracy. From 
these memorial discourses, both parties asserted a democratic legitimacy 
to present a post-war program for economic and social transformation. As 
Schumacher claimed, "our legitimacy comes from history, from the 
past."17 Expectations for the future are often at the margins of memory 
studies, but-as Jon Cowan writes about post-war France-"assumptions 
of continuity between past and future meant that debates over the nation's 
future essentially hinged on the politics of memory," a claim that is equally 
valid for West Germany. 18 This chapter explores how SPD and SFIO nar-
ratives of what went wrong in the past-the lessons that each party derived 
from those experiences for their present and the proposals they designed 
for the future-often bore more in common with one another than they 
did with other political forces within their own nations. The SPD and 
SFIO also made frequent reference to the histories of their neighbours 
when interpreting developments in their own country. At crucial moments 
when their post-war democracies appeared threatened, party leaders inter-
preted their politics in a wider European context rather than as being 
bound within national borders. Taken together, these commonalities 
demonstrate that is a worthwhile endeavour to analyse these politicians as 
a single generation in the history of European social democracy. 
HISTORICAL LEGITIMACY IN FRENCH SOCIALIST 
AND GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSES EMERGING 
FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
In a series of meetings in 1947, European socialists debated the (re)admit-
tance of the SPD into their family of parties, then known as COMISCO, 
the predecessor of the Socialist International established in 1951. A domi-
nant feature of these discussions was the SPD's (in)action in the events 
leading up to the Nazi conquest of power in 1932-1933 and the relative 
impotence displayed by the German anti-fascist resistance during the 
Third Reich. Socialist delegates from the Netherlands and, in particular, 
from central Europe turned the proceedings into a sort of tribunal, in 
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which the SPD's leader, Kurt Schumacher, attempted to achieve legiti-
macy for his renascent party through a defence of the SPD's struggle and 
suffering during the preceding 15 years. 
Schumacher pleaded for the understanding and sympathy of his social-
ist colleagues. The discussion focused at first on the SPD's decision to 
preserve its name, signalling organisational and ideological continuity 
with the inter-war and turn-of-the-century SPD. Marinus van der Goes 
van Naters, a Dutch delegate of the Pvd.A, a party that changed its name 
from a Socialist to a Labour party after the Second World War, pointedly 
demanded of Schumacher: "Is the SPD ready to acknowledge its pre-war 
failure and start as a new party?" In response, Schumacher conceded SPD 
errors, which he rarely did in public. He rejected, though, his Dutch col-
league's link between inter-war failures and the necessity of renouncing his 
party's inheritance: 
You must see that it was necessary to reassemble what forces were available and 
for this purpose the power of attraction of an old banner is stronger than any 
new ot;ganisation . .. I always belonged to the rebels in the old party, but to deny 
the old party on that account we will never do. The party made mistakes now 
and again, also tactical errors, but it was the party that strove for great prin-
ciples which are today still demanded by the world and you should not make our 
failure your standard of judgment in all things. It is not always the better man 
who wins.19 
Here Schumacher received crucial support from French socialist represen-
tatives. Party leader Guy Mollet reminded his Socialist colleagues that his 
party had also resurrected its name and argued that this was no reason to 
exclude the SPD from international socialist meetings. In the end, 
COMISCO approved the (re)admittance of the SPD. 
Although battles for historical legitimacy generally took place within 
national political arenas, the cataclysm and traumas of the Second World 
War transcended borders, destroyed national myths, discredited political 
movements of the right and hoisted to power a new set of political elites 
who competed with one another to articulate new discourses of national 
memory during a period of confusion and dislocation. Although the idea 
of a "Zero Hour" ( Stunde Null) was a myth of the period, Nazi rule in 
Germany, the collapse of the French Third Republic and the "National 
Revolution" in France left ideological and mythological vacuums in 
Germany and in France. With fascism and collaboration having fallen into 
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public disrepute, French socialists and German social democrats attempted 
to formulate, propagate and cement new memorial discourses to legiti-
mate their parties' claims to political power. They sought, through repeti-
tion at party congresses, political rallies, in party presses and in parliamentary 
bodies to win normative status for their narrations of the past in order to 
achieve collective authority for the politics of their present and future .20 
Central to these rhetorical efforts were assertions by both parties that they 
were the most democratic of the political movements in their countries 
during both the inter- and post-war periods. 
To make these assertions convincing, the post-war generation of SPD 
and SFIO leaders prevented the re-emergence of inter-war party leaders 
whose past actions had compromised their credentials as defenders of 
democracy. The SPD voted against the Enabling Act that marked the end 
of the Weimar Republic in 1933, but it remained overwhelmingly passive as 
Nazi storm troopers solidified the NSDAP's political victory by conquering 
the streets of Germany. Schumacher was well known for advocating violent 
resistance to the NSDAP as a leader of the republican Iron Front in 
1931-1933, activities that led to his arrest and long-term imprisonment. 
Such actions, however, were those of a clear minority within the 
SPD. Schumacher did not make much of his own resistance activities after 
the war, but his ascent to leadership was in effect a retroactive endorsement 
of his activism during this fateful period and a condemnation of the impo-
tency of the SPD leadership in the last years of the Weimar Republic . 
Schumacher's reaction to a German communist campaign in 1945 to 
malign a prominent official of the Weimar-era SPD, Carl Severing, who had 
preached non-resistance as Prussian Interior Minister in 1932 and who now 
sought a new leadership role in the post-war SPD, was an implicit rejection 
of the SPD's Weimar leadership. Schumacher refused to lend his own legiti-
macy, nor that of his party, to Severing's public efforts to defend himself.21 
Although the SPD unanimously rejected the Enabling Act of 1933, 
thus allowing it to retrospectively claim credit for having opposed the 
Nazis in the Reichstag, SFIO deputies split their votes when-in the chaos 
of the French military defeat of 1940-the National Assembly convened 
in Vichy and voted full powers to Marshal Philippe Petain. Although the 
Socialist tally did not break down completely along the factional lines of 
the late 1930s, for the most part a pacifist wing around party leader Paul 
Faure voted for Petain's investiture and sought to integrate itself into the 
new institutions of the "National Revolution." Anti-fascists around par-
liamentary leader Leon Blum voted in opposition and provided the first 
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cadres of the underground SFIO resistance. Emerging from the Second 
World War, the SFIO undertook the most profound post-war purge of 
any French political party.22 Underground party leader Daniel Mayer 
pushed for the exclusion of all deputies who had voted for Petain's inves-
titure ( the party later allowed a few to re-join if they had proven resis-
tance credentials), all mayors who had remained in office under Vichy 
without explicit party approval, all socialists who had praised Vichy or 
the occupiers in any way and anyone known to have been involved in 
black-market activities.23 These actions allowed the 1944 SFIO Congress 
to declare during the liberation of France, "The party has carried out a 
victory upon itself ... It has chased from its breast traitors, cowards, 
weaklings. " 24 
Post-war socialist leaders defended the democratic constitutions of 
their inter-war republics from the stigma of having failed to prevent the 
rise of dictatorships. The narrative developed in Blum's A FEchelle 
Humaine set the contours around which the SFIO developed its critique 
of the Third Republic and its vision for a Fourth. Casting judgment on the 
politics of the Third Republic, Blum admitted that there were elements of 
"instability, of discontinuity, of inefficiency" but declared that, "Taken as 
a whole, the Third Republic, like the Second and the First, was an honest 
regime."25 He saw the failures of the inter-war period not in democratic 
institutions but in those who directed them. Schumacher, for his part, said 
in 1946 that, "the Weimar constitution was undoubtedly the best in the 
world. How come this modern constitution worked so terribly[?]. . .it 
[was] due to the spirit [ of the time] and the people who wielded it. "26 
Fritz Erler, later an important SPD official, made a similar point in January 
1947: "It was much less a sign of the weakness of the Weimar Constitution 
and much more of the Weimar Republic .... Democracy in Germany did 
not surrender in 1919 during the building of the constitution, but rather 
in the years thereafter ... ". 27 
SFIO and SPD leaders put forward aggressive claims to lead their coun-
tries towards democratic futures by arguing that their parties had foreseen 
the dangers of fascism in the inter-war period. In the SFIO's narrative, 
France's property-owning class had committed treason because it preferred 
Adolf Hitler to Blum, who had led the Popular Front governments of 
1936-1938. The underground party press declared in 1941 that the 
French military defeat of 1940 was a "catastrophe desired and prepared by 
[French fascists]. "28 In 1943, a clandestine socialist newspaper claimed that 
socialists had correctly understood the challenges of the inter-war period: 
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We are «men of the past»? Error: we are the men of the future. The truth is that 
in the past we were already the men of the future. We foresaw yesterday what 
would come to pass, we presented solutions that were not carried through and 
which, if they had been accepted, would have avoided this catastrophe .. . 29 
On 6 May 1945, Kurt Schumacher struck a similar tone in his first pub-
lic speech since 1933. He recalled the SPD slogan of the 1930s that 
"Hitler means war" and claimed in countless speeches over the next year 
that the German people had not adequately heeded the SPD's warning.30 
Schumacher resurrected his inter-war rhetoric, invoking his belligerent 
1932 speech to the Reichstag, in which he called the Nazis "Neanderthals" 
and Nazism the "pinnacle of human stupidity." 31 The SPD presented a 
social-democratic version of the "Sonderweg," Germany's "special path." 
Schumacher assigned an economic origin to Nazism, proclaiming that 
"German's large property class ( Groflbesitz) knew what it was doing! ... 
Heavy industry, armaments capital, militarism and all their vassals, who 
afterwards seek to distance themselves from what the Nazis tried to do, 
bear as mid-wives ofNazi tyranny the full responsibility for everything that 
happened." 32 "The Social Democratic Party," Schumacher told his inter-
national socialist colleagues in June 1947, "was the only party in Germany 
whose members made real sacrifices for freedom and democracy during 
the period of the [Weimar] Republic's crisis." 33 
The politics of memory were also central to socialist efforts to discredit 
other political groups. Socialists propagated their own narratives of these 
groups' histories. In his May 1945 speech, Schumacher portrayed a 
German liberal movement condemned by its historical failures : The 1848 
revolutions marked the original sin of German liberalism when the German 
bourgeoisie sided with reactionary forces .34 In December, he proclaimed 
that, "The great ideas of the great French Revolution have no place any 
more among our German liberals; they now only have sanctuary among 
the socialists." 35 Schumacher repeatedly attacked the German Communist 
Party (KPD) for targeting the SPD and not committing itself to the 
defence of Weimar democracy. He went so far as to claim that, "If the 
KPD had not sabotaged democracy together with the Nazis and the 
German Nationalists, we would have had no Third Reich and no Second 
World War." Nor did he spare the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
led by the former mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer. In his June 1947 
comments to COMISCO, Schumacher said that, "The CDU is the great 
collector (Sammelbecken) of property-owners, Nazis and reactionaries." 36 
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The CDU and SPD engaged in a running war of words as they competed 
to become the largest party of post-war Germany. In response to CDU 
criticisms of the passivity of SPD inter-war leaders Otto Braun and Carl 
Severing, Schumacher responded with this criticism of the CDU's prede-
cessor, the Centre Party, during the final years of Weimar: 
. . . since Mr. Adenauer likes to speak so much of Braun and Severing-who 
negotiated for a governing coalition with the Nazis in summer 1932? Who 
wanted to rule together with the Nazis? It was the Centre Party and also that 
part of the Centre Party that Adenauer and his cohort represented. And finally, 
dear Assembly, Mr. [Franz] von Papen was also previously a Prussian local 
delegate of the Centre Party . .. . the right-wing of the Centre Party, represented 
by Dr. Adenauer and his friends, is unteachable and is engaging in the same 
politics and the same hateful and objectionable methods with those who have 
already once destroyed democracy. 37 
Schumacher concluded that, "democracy in Germany is today not much 
stronger than the Social Democratic Party." 38 
In France, SFIO leaders thought that socialism was "master of the 
hour" after the Second World War.39 Their initial concern was to convince 
Free French leader Charles de Gaulle to declare publicly his support for 
democracy and overcome his disdain for political parties. As Mayer stated 
in 1944: "A democracy cannot live without parties, without the loyal 
competition of diverse political organisations."40 By 1945, the party found 
itselflocked in a dispute over the powers of the National Assembly vis-a-
vis de Gaulle's executive. Socialist Andre Philip, who had joined de Gaulle 
in London exile, declared in frustration : "We want him [ de Gaulle] to stay, 
but we also want him to get used to democracy."41 Although Blum had 
called for a strong executive in .A PEchelle Humaine, the SFIO generally 
shared the republican consensus that equated republicanism with parlia-
mentary rule . A presidential system, to the SFIO, meant "personal rule," 
in other words, a dictatorship based on the Bonapartist model. After de 
Gaulle resigned from his post as premier and gave a June 1946 speech 
denouncing the parliamentary system, Blum declared the need for a 
"Third Force" coalition charged with "republican defence" against the 
Gaullist right and communist left . 
Soon after the ratification of a new constitution, the French Fourth 
Republic appeared endangered from the right and the left as de Gaulle 
hammered the government for inadequately defending French interests 
and the Communist Party adopted an aggressive attitude after the tripartite 
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government ended in spring 1947. In summer, Socialist Premier Paul 
Ramadier spoke of the need to "defend the Republic" and warned darkly 
of "conspirators who ... have formed associations intending to wield vio-
lence against the Republic."42 Massive strikes broke out in French industry 
in 1948, which the government treated as an attempted coup d)etat to 
overthrow democracy and install a soviet-style system on the model of the 
recent Prague coup in Czechoslovakia.43 In Germany as well, vivid memo-
ries of the inter-war period and a wave of strikes led the SPD to worry that 
poor economic conditions could prove fatal for post-war democratization. 
With democracy seemingly under siege in France by 1947 and hardly 
begun in Germany, French socialists and German social democrats observed 
in dismay that their designs for economic democracy, which they consid-
ered a necessary prerequisite for political democracy, stalled as the political 
winds shifted to the right. Increasingly on the defensive within a few years 
of the end of the war, neither French nor German socialists were confident 
that their nations' futures would be democratic. 
A NEW BEGINNING OR RESTORATION? SOCIALIST DOUBTS 
ABOUT FRENCH AND GERMAN DEMOCRACY, 1949-1952 
When West Germany held its first federal elections in August 1949, SPD 
leaders were convinced that a "restoration" of Germany's traditional, anti-
democratic political culture was under way.44 Party leaders argued that, 
without Allied interference, revolutionary elements in Germany would 
have enacted a more far-reaching and effective purge of the public admin-
istration and economy. Without such a purge, Schumacher declared, "for 
the second time the revolution threatens to wash away."45 At party con-
gresses, SPD officials lamented that U .S. and British occupying authorities 
had reinstated former Nazis to positions in the bureaucracy and police . 
Although they considered the underground Nazi movement to be inca-
pable yet of"dramatic and dynamic action," they worried about the impact 
inter-party jockeying for the votes of former Nazis would have on the 
wider political culture.46 The re-staffing of bureaucracies with people who 
had exhibited a marked hostility to the left during Weimar seemed to bode 
poorly for the inculcation of a new democratic spirit. 
SFI O and SPD leaders often relied on a common set of recent historical 
examples to craft their assessment of German Christian democracy at the 
birth of the Bonn republic. Although Allied governments expressed relief 
that political forces programmatically committed to democracy won the 
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vast majority of votes in the 1949 elections, the slight advance of the 
CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) over the SPD caused consternation 
in both the SPD and the SFIO. The SFIO launched a press campaign call-
ing for the SPD's inclusion in a grand coalition.47 The examples of 
Christian dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and inter-war Austria shaped 
SFIO and SPD views of Christian democracy. Salomon Grumbach, the 
SFIO's leading expert on Germany, told the 1949 SFIO congress, "There 
is the Christian-Democratic Party, which may be a democratic party, but is 
far more Christian," and he explicitly compared developments in Germany 
with those in France, noting that former Petainists were joining the 
Christian democratic (MRP) and Gaullist (RPF) parties.48 Four days after 
the CDU/CSU victory, Schumacher cast this judgment: "Inside the 
Christian Democrats there is a large right-wing movement that is very 
reserved towards democracy. Also, their clerical core likes more the 
Christian state in the style of the Austria of [Engelbert] Dolfuss or [Kurt] 
Schuschnigg and of [Francisco] Franco's Spain."49 Two years later, 
Grumbach presented the CDU through the prism of a dangerous, trans-
national Catholic political ascendancy in Western Europe.50 
As occupation controls began to fall in Germany, a moderate yet clear 
recrudescence of neo-Nazi activities and far-right politics made international 
headlines from 1949 to 1952, shaking the politics of the young republic. A 
series of amnesty laws to free people from de-Nazification, the readmission 
of former Nazis into government administration and a public campaign for 
the pardoning of German war criminals represented a reassertion of right-
wing elements in West German society who had kept a prudent silence dur-
ing the early years of occupation. Most ominous of all was the emergence of 
a political party of former Nazis, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), the rheto-
ric, means of mobilisation and organisational structure of which mimicked 
those of the NSDAP.51 The SRP has received relatively little attention 
from historians, but its presence on the early democratic scene did much 
to shape the early political culture of the Bonn republic. After years argu-
ing that Germans would more effectively de-N azify the country if left to 
do it on their own, the SPD faced the situation that it was the occupation 
authorities, not the German government, that acted as the decisive agents 
in the suppression ofneo-Nazi movements.52 Abroad-as part of its cam-
paign to regain full German sovereignty-the party argued that reports 
about neo-Nazism were sensationalist and exaggerated and that the far 
right did not represent a credible threat to German democracy. At home, 
however, social democrats criticized the lax attitude of the government, 
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engaged in direct confrontations with the far right and fretted that neo-
Nazism was gaining a foothold within the more establishment parties. 
In November 1949, German Party deputy and former Nazi Party 
member Wolfgang Hedler gave a speech in which he claimed that Germans 
bore "minimal guilt" for the Second World War and that anti-Nazi German 
resisters were "national traitors." Most incendiary of all, he said, "It is pos-
sible to have differing opinions about the question of whether gassing the 
Jews was the means of choice. Maybe other ways could have been found 
to get rid of them." 53 A social democratic official recorded his comments 
and reported it to the party. In January 1950, Hedler was put on trial for 
disparaging the memory of German resisters, for insulting Jews and for 
inciting violence. The list of co-plaintiffs, including Schumacher and SPD 
deputy Jacob Altmaier, who was Jewish, propelled the trial into the inter-
national spotlight. Two of the three presiding judges had been former 
Nazi party members. They created a peculiarly narrow standard of guilt: 
whether or not Hedler's comments indicated that he approved the gassing 
of Jews. On this basis, the court acquitted Hedler. To SPD leaders, the 
Weimar practice of judges acting leniently towards right-wing agitators 
appeared to be reasserting itself. 
Five days after the verdict, Schumacher asked, "Who will protect us 
against these judges, who, due to the will of local occupation authorities, 
are made up of at least 70 per cent former Nazis? ... Especially the judges 
who have lost all the respect of a large portion of the people and who car-
ried out the work of the primitive Gestapo officers, must first earn our 
trust."54 In March 1950, the SPD central committee dedicated a whole 
session to "Defence against Neo-fascism." The SPD's leader in Schleswig-
Holstein told the meeting, "We must ensure that the police are with us 
and forbid any militarist organisation." Schumacher responded that, "the 
police are unreliable and the justice system is against us ." 55 The same day 
as the Hedler verdict, the SPD introduced two bills into the Bundestag. 
The first, a "Law against the Enemies ofDemocracy," called for the impris-
onment of those who threatened force against the republic, who 
"render[ ed] the republic's flag contemptible or impugn[ ed] the dignity of 
a group of people on the basis of race, belief, or [ world view]," or insulted 
the memory of victims. The second bill would retroactively legalize the 
actions of those who had resisted Nazism in 1933-1945.56 
The party executive decided to set up an internal office to track and 
respond to neo-Nazi movements. Personal notes from SPD Vice-Chairman 
Erich Ollenhauer's archive provide a snapshot of the SPD's assessment of 
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neo-Nazism. He wrote that there were not sufficient laws to suppress 
these types of parties and that the state and police were proceeding with 
excessive hesitation: The "State must prove its authority . . . [because] 
Neo-fascist powers only recognize strength."57 Local SPD chapters organ-
ised counter-demonstrations with other groups each time a SRP speaker 
came to town. Regional SPD interior ministers, after street brawls at SRP 
rallies, banned SRP leaders from speaking in Schleswig-Holstein and 
Lower Saxony, the largest bastions of far-right support in post-war West 
Germany. After SRP leader Fritz Dorls called the Bavarian Social 
Democratic Interior Minister Wilhelm Roegner "the most despicable 
subject the German earth has ever brought forth" for attending the 
Nuremberg executions of German war criminals, the Bundestag lifted his 
immunity.58 Dorls was placed on trial for slander, and Roegner banned 
SRP rallies in Bavaria. In February 1950, Schumacher said that "the great 
sin of the Weimar Republic is repeating itself'' and, due to its alleged reluc-
tance to condemn right-wing movements, "The German middle is making 
the same mistake as during the Weimar Republic." 59 SPD leaders later 
welcomed the decision of the German constitutional court to ban the SRP 
in 1952.60 
As they denounced anti-democratic groups in Germany, SPD leaders 
expressed even greater concern about political developments in France. In 
a September 1945 speech, Schumacher highlighted how democracy was 
more historically implanted in England and France than in Germany.61 
However, when the new Gaullist Party (RPF) achieved great success in the 
1947 French municipal elections, Schumacher looked at events in France 
with foreboding: "What we must consider is the fact that a people with 
such a tradition of democracy, with four revolutions, voted ... 70% in its 
large cities for potential hangmen of democracy." Worst of all, he declared, 
"is the fatal parallels in France with the political situation of Germany in 
1932."62 The growing alienation between socialist parties and working-
class voters, who tended to support communists in France and in Italy, 
augured poorly for European democracy: "Where developments have led 
to distance between workers and social democrats, the middle classes are 
not in a position to maintain democracy over the long term. We are expe-
riencing that already in the rocking [ taking place] in Italy and in France. "63 
In private, SFIO leaders largely agreed with this dire assessment. French 
socialists did not view France to be immune from the fate that befell inter-
war German democracy. Mollet echoed Schumacher's despair in September 
1947 in a SFIO party executive meeting: "if we go on like this, in six 
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months we will all end up in concentration camps."64 A year later he said 
that, "The present situation is quite similar to that of Germany in 1932."65 
That both SFIO and SPD leaders turned to the example ofl932 Germany 
to interpret events in late-1940s France indicates the weight that memo-
ries of Weimar's collapse exerted on their interpretations of the present. 
The analogy of the Weimar Republic had such strength that SFIO leaders 
at times debated tactics through contrary interpretations of the "lessons" 
ofWeimar. In January 1949, the SFIO National Council discussed whether 
to continue participating in a Radical-led government that was steadily 
moving to the right. Edouard Depreux couched his opposition to partici-
pation by stating: 
German Social Democracy was filled with good faith when, in agreement with 
the Catholic Centre to fight on two fronts against Hitler and the communists, 
it went from concession to concession until it accepted participation in 
[Chancellor Heinrich} Bruning'sgovernment, the social policy of which is not 
so different from a government directed by the Radicals in France. Result: a 
lar;ge part of the German proletariat marched to the communists.66 
Mollet defended participation with a counter-narrative: It was only after 
multiple elections and permanent agitation that Hitler seized power. For 
Mollet, forcing the dissolution of the French Assembly would only benefit 
communists and Gaullists. 
Operating within national boundaries, few historians have analysed 
how revisionist and reactionary sentiment about the wartime experience 
peaked in France and Germany during the same years. In 1951, the 
French electorate returned an Assembly considerably to the right of its 
predecessor. The SFIO acquiesced uncomfortably as an amnesty bill for 
Vichy collaborators began emptying prisons during a period when neo-
Petainist sentiment reached an apogee. Observing events across the 
Rhine, Schumacher stated that without the U.S., France and Italy would 
already be dictatorships.67 He called France "the weak point" of democ-
racy in Europe. His analysis of the French election was apocalyptic, and he 
compared the SFIO's tactics with those of the Weimar-era SPD: It was "a 
Hitler election result. If the Socialists enter government or tolerate a 
minority government, the process of dissolution will take place."68 
Grumbach recalled that a sense of fatalism helped Hitler rise to power and 
warned his socialist colleagues privately that it could do so in France as 
well.69 As support for a new de Gaulle government grew, Mollet told a 
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party meeting, "That day the [SFIO] Directing Committee will have to 
call for a rebellion including everyone, including the [communists]. To 
accept de Gaulle is to accept a dictatorship. A popular demonstration 
could be effective even if broken."70 The siren call of a new Popular 
Front-and the deep-seated resistance this eventuality evoked within the 
Cold War-era socialist party-complicated internal party discussions 
about how to effectively defend parliamentary democracy. 
Historical memory of Europe's tumultuous inter-war period framed 
this generation of socialist leaders' understanding of the predicament fac-
ing French democracy. In September 1951, Mollet told the SFIO National 
Council, "De Gaulle's fascism is as dangerous for us as it was for the other 
democracies-even ifit is different ... [and] the comparison is misplaced in 
certain regards-the fascism of Hitler, the fascism of [Benito] Mussolini ... 
it resembles more that of [Portuguese dictator Antonio de Oliveira] 
Salazar ... the day when Hitler was called to power, in Germany, it was after 
a quite similar electoral success . . . as that just achieved by the RPF."71 
Although hopes for a stable democratic regime in France rallied in the 
years that followed, worse was to come. 
AN AUTHORITARIAN CONTAGION? THE CONSOLIDATION 
OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY 
AND THE FALL OF THE FRENCH FOURTH REPUBLIC, 
1953-1958 
The CDU/CSU victory in the 1953 federal elections (its vote increased 
14.2% to reach 45.2% as the SPD vote stagnated) unleashed a wave offear 
in the SPD leadership that the CDU might use its newfound strength to 
eliminate the bases of democratic opposition in Germany. In the lead-up 
to the elections, Erler warned, "political Catholicism [has] a tendency 
towards authoritarian state-building."72 The new party leader, Erich 
Ollenhauer, who replaced Schumacher after his death in 1952, stated, 
"We are closer today in the Bundesrepublik to an authoritarian system than 
to a free Volksstaaf' due to "the authoritarian attitude of the government 
and above all of the head of government towards the parliament. m3 SPD 
leaders fretted that far right and unreformed Nazis were joining the 
Christian democrats, thereby "strengthen[ing] the restorative, nationalist 
and authoritarian politics of the CDU/CSU."74 Ollenhauer's analysis in 
private party discussions was directly informed by the Nazi electoral 
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success of 1933. He warned that the CDU would likely attempt a "syn-
chronization process" [ Gleichschaltungsprozess] to eliminate the indepen-
dence of the trade unions, the press, the arts, and the state ( Land) 
governments.75 Faced with signs of "a totalitarian and war-like danger" as 
the government pressed for German rearmament, Ollenhauer called on 
the SPD to vigorously contest such efforts "before it is too late."76 A few 
years later, the party opposed the banning of the Communist Party by the 
Constitutional Court, a ruling that followed a request by Adenauer's gov-
ernment. Ollenhauer told the SPD parliamentary group that the decision 
was "political foolishness that will in the long term bring only damage to 
democracy." Furthermore, "we must strongly protest that the 
implementation [ of the ruling] by the police, the arrests, the house 
searches and police seizures in certain cases are being carried out in the 
spirit of the purges after the Reichstag fire of February 1933."77 
Having shared the SPD's assessments of German democracy due to a 
similar understanding of the recent past in 1946-1951, the experience of 
SFIO leaders with Christian democracy in France, and its dealings with 
CDU politicians in international fora in the 1950s, led them to a contrary 
interpretation of the 1953 election. The SFIO leadership now considered 
the CDU to have proven its democratic credentials and welcomed its suc-
cess at the polls. No doubt to avoid a confrontation with SPD delegates at 
a Socialist International meeting in February 1954, Mollet crossed out the 
following statement from his speech: "The vote of September 1953 was a 
great victory for democracy and for Europe. The democratic parties-our 
Social Democratic friends and Adenauer's CDU, won votes and seats to 
the detriment of nationalists and the Communist and Nazi parties have 
been practically struck from the political map .ms This comment foreshad-
owed the amiable spirit of cooperation that Mollet developed with 
Adenauer during his tenure as French premier in 1956-1957. Lamenting 
the state of French politics in November 1957, Mollet told a socialist audi-
ence, "I dream of a [French] conservative party on ... the German model. m 9 
The politics of memory, despite their resiliency, are never set in stone. 
Although fears of renewed German militarism reached a crescendo in 
French politics during the European Defence Community debates of 
1954, concerns for German democracy steadily lost their potency within 
the SFIO leadership during the 1950s. The SPD's reaction to the CDU's 
thumping victory ofl957, when the CDU/CSU became the first party in 
German history to reach an absolute majority, demonstrates that the SPD 
leadership, unlike SFIO leaders, continued to mistrust Adenauer. The 
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party press stated, "German democracy must now pass its trial by fire" 
because "the electors of the Federal Republic have given the CDU an 
absolute majority and with it carte blanche to build one party rule ."80 
Important elements within the party privately argued that such fears were 
exaggerated, but publicly the SPD sounded the alarm against Adenauer. 
In January 1958, Ollenhauer wrote, "The attempted Gleichschaltung of 
regional elections, the plans of the Interior Minister to build a state secu-
rity office and Adenauer's dangerous line of thought that the opposition 
has no rights shows [that]. .. the governing party is orienting itself more 
and more in a conservative-restorative direction." Adenauer, the text went 
on, "is exploiting his position of power to build an authoritarian one-man-
system in a centralized unity state and is therefore endangering 
democracy. "81 
It was France, however, that faced the most serious threat to parliamen-
tary democracy. After a narrow victory in 1951 for pro-regime parties, the 
December 1955 national elections took place amidst a popular tax revolt 
led by Pierre Poujade. The small-town, lower middle-class demographics 
of the Poujadist movement and its violent anti-parliamentary rhetoric 
invited comparisons with inter-war fascism.82 In October 1955, socialist 
Gerard Jaquet worried that little was needed to spark a fascist uprising.83 
After the election, Mollet gave a similar view: "We know well that in 
France there is a permanent fascist movement ... " more dangerous than 
the Gaullists because it contains "the hardest, youngest, most aggressive 
elements. The immense danger I see in Poujadism are the violent demon-
strations that it will provoke, that could lead to a new Popular Front 
directed by the [PCF] and the [Communist-aligned trade union] C.G.T."84 
In a dynamic that recalled 1934-1935, the leadership received reports of 
local SFIO chapters collaborating with Communists, portending a grass-
roots Popular Front from below. The perceived danger of the far right and 
left-wing unity efforts played a role in the SFIO's decision to lead a 
"Republican Front" governing coalition in January 1956. Whereas Mollet 
worried that "an impotent majority" led by the Socialists would be "sui-
cide [for] the party and democracy," Andre Philip and Christian Pineau 
put forth the "republican defence" argument that, when the republic was 
in danger, the SFIO must come to its aid. Under party pressure, Mollet 
agreed to become premier. 
Mollet's government was the longest lasting of the Fourth Republic, 
but it struggled to contain growing domestic discontent, runaway infla-
tion, and an escalating war to maintain French rule in Algeria, the success 
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of which many socialists believed vital to the survival of the regime. Other 
socialists broke with the government over Algeria, with Philip, for instance, 
accusing Mollet of "creating the psychological conditions that slowly 
formed in Germany after 1930 and brought about the basis of the fascist 
movement."85 Mallet's government was followed by a series of short-
lived, acrimonious coalitions in 1957-1958. Socialist participation in these 
ad hoc coalitions faced growing internal opposition.86 Comments from 
disgruntled SFIO deputies were similar to the view Ollenhauer had 
expressed a few years earlier of the miniscule Italian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDI), which allied with Italy's Christian democratic-led govern-
ment: "A Social Democratic Party that enters a coalition in which its polit-
ical power is not necessary, but rather represents only an auxiliary resource, 
carries itself to its own grave."87 
The prospect of a military "State within a State" a la Weimar had done 
much to shape the SPD's opposition to German rearmament in the 1950s. 
Now it reset the terms of debate within the SFIO. On 13 May 1958, the 
Algiers European population revolted against the government for alleg-
edly preparing to abandon French Algeria. In the dramatic days and weeks 
of May-June 1958, much of the military leadership in Algeria rallied to its 
side. Facing a military revolt, the dominant historical analogy for Mollet 
was not Germany in 1932 but rather the attempted coup by Spanish 
General Francisco Franco in 1936 and the eventual victory of his forces in 
the ensuing Spanish Civil War. Jules Moch, again Interior Minister, 
reported that the army was in full revolt and that he had no faith that the 
metropolitan police would resist a military invasion of Paris. Backroom 
bargaining, rumours, and memories of the June 1940 Assembly investi-
ture of Petain combined to create a toxic mood in the party. As calls for 
"de Gaulle to power" mounted throughout the country, the socialist par-
liamentary group was furious to learn that its leadership had entered into 
secret negotiations with him. Whispers of "treason" punctuated socialist 
meetings. Many socialists saw Franco's image in de Gaulle, but Mollet 
now disagreed, saying that he preferred de Gaulle to a "Francoist 
government" or a "government of colonels. "88 Casting his eye over recent 
European history, Mollet reminded his colleagues that no internal revolu-
tion had overthrown a military regime in Europe without foreign inter-
vention. Monnet's narrative of the Spanish Civil War's implications for 
France signalled his new openness to allying with de Gaulle to break the 
impasse in Algeria. 
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In a climate of fear that paratroopers would soon land in Paris, Mollet 
and other leading politicians attained enough concessions from de Gaulle 
to maintain the pretence of republican legality for a transitional govern-
ment. After 13 years of denouncing de Gaulle, Mollet now asked the SFI 0 
to support his return to power. A series of tense meetings, in which some 
socialist deputies called for a broad anti-fascist coalition with the PCF, 
resulted in a 77-74 vote in de Gaulle's favour. However, a slim majority of 
SFIO deputies then voted against de Gaulle's investiture in the National 
Assembly on 1 June 1958. Mollet and two other Socialists entered de 
Gaulle's cabinet, to which the parliament granted full powers and charged 
with the task of writing a new constitution. Angry and bitter, a large num-
ber of SFIO deputies who opposed de Gaulle seceded to form the 
Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA), which later became the Unified 
Socialist Party (PSU). As the SPD's envoy to a PSA party congress reported 
to Ollenhauer, the socialists of the new party "think that democracy no 
longer exists (police measures, newspaper censorship, one-sided radio 
broadcasting, military intervention in political events)" and "fear-and 
say it openly-that de Gaulle is preparing a military dictatorship that will 
support itself strongly on the upper clergy of the Catholic Church. "89 
As the Fourth Republic collapsed, Ollenhauer warned party officials 
privately in June 1958 that, "the developments of the last ten years in 
France bear certain resemblances to the period between 1930 and 1932 in 
Germany."90 The SPD sympathized with the SFIO's anti-Gaullist faction, 
but after Moch told Ollenhauer that he had lost authority over the police, 
the SPD leadership urged party members to restrain their criticism of 
Mollet. As events unfolded in France, Herbert Wehner said to the SPD 
central committee, "The strengthening appetite for authoritarian 
tendencies can also be a formidable problem for us,'' while Ollenhauer 
warned that "repercussions are to be feared in Germany."91 In October, 
Ollenhauer said that "there are plenty of people [ in Germany] who would 
very much like to imitate de Gaulle's example."92 In the face of a possible 
civil war in France, the SPD could do little more than hope that the Fifth 
Republic would prove less authoritarian than it feared while girding itself 
against Adenauer's alleged wish "to be a second de Gaulle."93 After the 
new French constitution created a presidential system to replace parlia-
mentary rule, the SPD worried that events in France would act as a conta-
gion in Germany, especially after Adenauer launched a campaign to move 
from the Chancellorship to the Presidency.94 Ollenhauer told SPD officials, 
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"One must unfortunately say that the prospects that the November [1958] 
elections in France will result in a parliament that conforms to our concep-
tion of parliamentary democracy .. .is quite slim ... What will this mean for 
Europe? What will this mean for Germany .. . ? Our [ Christian democrats] 
already have a lot of sympathy for a system in between democracy and 
dictatorship ... and [ will say] that we must now adjust our constitution ... "95 
Memories of the inter-war years, when dictatorship spread from one 
European nation to the next, loomed large in the SPD's ominous analysis 
of events in France at the dawn of the Fifth Republic. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated how a transnational collective memory of 
the inter-war period among the first generation of post-war SFIO and 
SPD leaders informed their analyses of democracy in France and in West 
Germany from 1945 to 1958. In private discussions, each party consid-
ered the other country's past, and that of other Western European coun-
tries, to be directly relevant to their understanding of political developments 
in their own nations. This generation of post-war SFIO and SPD leaders 
interpreted their recent traumas and the prospects for democratic futures 
not only within national but also within transnational and European per-
spectives. In addition, this chapter has argued that, under the influence of 
narratives of what happened in Europe in 1932-1945, the SPD and SFIO 
leaderships viewed their democracies to be under sustained threat for 
more than a decade after the war, a threat borne out by events in France 
in 1958 if not in Germany. The SFIO leadership gained confidence in 
West German democracy before the SPD, whose leaders looked to the 
future with caution and even pessimism through the 1950s. Historical 
experiences and narratives sustained a psychological atmosphere of fear, 
isolation and mistrust among the post-war generation of SPD leaders. 
In 1959-1960, the pull of the past weakened within each party. The 
SPD abandoned its revolutionary program of social and economic trans-
formation at its Bad Godesberg party congress in 1959. In 1960-1961, it 
began a public campaign to find "common ground" ( Gemeimsamkeit) 
and stopped criticizing the "authoritarian" nature of Christian democ-
racy, most dramatically when it took a moderate stance in the 1962 Spiegel 
affair after Adenauer's government threatened to bring treason charges 
against a leading magazine for publishing secret documents and for criti-
cizing German defence policy. During the 1960s, the SPD presented itself 
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to the German electorate as the "better party" rather than the only true 
democratic party. With the nomination of the youthful Willy Brandt as 
SPD candidate for chancellor in 1961, the SPD dampened the apocalyptic 
tone of its historical narratives and sought alliances with liberals and 
Christian democrats, thus paving the way for the party's participation in 
ruling coalitions from 1966 to 1982. The context of French politics 
shifted as well. Many socialists continued to denounce the authoritarian 
tendencies of de Gaulle's presidency, branded him a dictator-in-the-mak-
ing, and hoped to restore parliamentary rule in France. In contrast, a 
larger group of socialists saw de Gaulle as the only person capable of 
resolving the Algerian War without destroying French democracy. In the 
mid-1960s the political culture ofFrance and Germany changed as social-
ist leaders found themselves contesting new interpretations of the traumas 
and lessons of the inter-war period that were being aggressively put forth 
by the student generation of '68. Politics in Western Europe had entered 
a new era. 
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